Activating streaming video in a blu-ray disc player

ABSTRACT

Techniques are described herein for using cryptographic elements of the Advanced Access Content System (AACS) in a client-server environment to cryptographically authenticate client applications that are executing on non-revoked AACS-compliant playback devices. The techniques described herein may be used to protect a server application from providing information to client applications executing in non-AACS-compliant or revoked environments. In one embodiment, the techniques are used to authenticate a Blu-ray Disc Java Application executing on a non-revoked AACS-compliant Blu-ray Disc Player.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present disclosure relates generally to cryptographic-basedauthentication in a client-server environment, and more particularly tocryptographic-based authentication of a client application executing onan Advanced Access Content System (AACS) compliant device communicatingwith a server application.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE

A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains materialwhich is subject to copyright protection. The copyright owner has noobjection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent documentor the patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and TrademarkOffice patent file or records, but otherwise reserves all copyrightrights whatsoever. Copyright © 2009 Netflix, Inc.

BACKGROUND

The Blu-ray Disc Association (BDA) is an industry consortium responsiblefor establishing format standards and specifications for the Blu-rayDisc media format. For example, the BDA has authored a formatspecification related to playback of pre-recorded audiovisual programsby Blu-ray Disc playback devices (BD-Players) known generally as the“Blu-ray Disc Read-Only (ROM) Format”. Other format specificationsauthored by the BDA include the “Blu-ray Disc Recordable (R) Format” andthe “Blu-ray Disc Rewritable (RE) Format”. The BDA format specificationsare referred to herein collectively as the Blu-ray Disc Specification,or BD-Specification.

An aspect of the BD-Specification facilitates the development ofcomputer program logic or applications for the Blu-ray Disc Playerplatform that provide enhanced or interactive content to viewers. Theseapplications are referred to in the BD-Specification as Blu-ray DiscJava Applications, or BD-J Applications. For example, a BD-J Applicationmay be authored that provides, among other things, a picture-in-picturemovie commentary or an interactive game to accompany the primary Blu-rayDisc content.

The version of the BD-Specification known as “BD-Live” requirescompliant BD-players to implement networking functionality forconnecting to a data network, such as the Internet. A BD-J Applicationexecuting on a compliant BD-player can use the network capability todownload and play back content such as, for example, a full-lengthmotion picture received from a remote server over the Internet. Forexample, a subscription based content provider may author a BD-JApplication that, upon execution by a BD-Player, connects to a serverand downloads a list of movie titles that are available for viewing on apay-per-view basis or as part of a subscription service. The viewer maythen select one of the titles from a menu presented on the viewer'stelevision screen whereupon the BD-J Application will downloadsuccessive portions of the selected movie title from a server andinstruct the BD-Player to playback the portions as they are received. Inthis way, a BD-J Application executing on a BD-Player can provideplayback of streaming video downloaded over the Internet or othernetwork.

To protect against unauthorized access to copyrighted content downloadedover a network, BD-Players may implement the Advanced Access ContentSystem (AACS) content protection system. The AACS is a standard forcontent distribution and digital rights management developed by anindustry consortium with the aim of restricting unauthorized access toAACS protected content recorded on removable media (e.g., Blu-ray Discs)or downloaded over a network such as the Internet. The AACS standardincludes the following specification books authored by the AACSconsortium members: “Introduction and Common Cryptographic ElementsRevision 0.91 Feb. 17, 2007”, “Pre-recorded Video Book Revision 0.92Nov. 29, 2008”, and “Blu-ray Disc Pre-recorded Book Revision 0.921 Jun.6, 2008.” These books are referred to herein collectively as the AACSSpecification.

Content providers that deliver AACS protected content over the Internetand network-enabled playback devices that download AACS protectedcontent may implement a certain encryption/decryption scheme to protectand access content. While AACS may be sufficient to protect againstunauthorized access to AACS protected content, AACS does not provideexplicit mechanisms for a content provider that delivers AACS protectedcontent over a network to authenticate clients such as playback devicesthat request content or request other information such as, for example,subscription information like movie viewing history or billinginformation.

What is needed are techniques in a networked client and server for theserver to reliably authenticate client applications that are executingin AACS compliant environments. Ideally, the solution should allow theserver to reliably distinguish between client applications that areexecuting on non-revoked, AACS compliant platforms and clientapplications that are executing in revoked AACS environments or notexecuting within an AACS-compliant environment. Further, the solutionshould allow the server to reliably identify the client with whom theserver is communicating such that the server can safely communicateprivate information to the client. These and other needs are addressedby the invention described herein.

The approaches described in this section are approaches that could bepursued, but not necessarily approaches that have been previouslyconceived or pursued. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, it shouldnot be assumed that any of the approaches described in this sectionqualify as prior art merely by virtue of their inclusion in thissection.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In the drawings:

FIG. 1 illustrates a client application's use of an Advanced AccessContent System (AACS) API to validate an AACS permission.

FIG. 2 illustrates authenticating a non-revoked AACS-compliant playbackdevice using AACS permissions.

FIG. 3 illustrates a client-server environment.

FIG. 4 illustrates a process for activating streaming video in a Blu-rayDisc Player.

FIG. 5 illustrates a process for activating streaming video in a Blu-rayDisc Player.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of a computer system that may be used in anembodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description, for the purposes of explanation, numerousspecific details are set forth in order to provide a thoroughunderstanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however,that the present invention may be practiced without these specificdetails. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shownin block diagram form in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring thepresent invention.

Reference in the following description to “one embodiment” or “anembodiment” means that a particular feature, structure, orcharacteristic described in connection with the embodiment is includedin at least one embodiment of the invention. The appearances of thephrase “in one embodiment” or “in an embodiment” in various places inthe following description are not necessarily all referring to the sameembodiment.

Functional Overview

Techniques are described herein for using cryptographic elements of theAdvanced Access Content System (AACS) in a client-server environment tocryptographically authenticate client applications that are executing onnon-revoked AACS-compliant playback devices. The techniques describedherein may be used to protect a server application from providinginformation to client applications executing in non-AACS-compliant orrevoked environments. In one embodiment, the techniques are used toauthenticate a Blu-ray Disc Java Application executing on a non-revokedAACS-compliant Blu-ray Disc Player.

Content Protection with AACS

In general, to protect content such as a feature length movie usingAACS, a content provider cryptographically encrypts the content using asecret cryptographic “Title Key” associated with the content. Theencrypted content and the Title Key are then provided to a non-revokedAACS-compliant playback device which then decrypts the content using theTitle Key before playback.

To prevent access to the content by a revoked or non-compliant playbackdevice, the Title Key itself is encrypted in a manner that allows onlynon-revoked AACS-compliant playback devices to access the unencryptedform of the Title Key. Specifically, the Title Key itself iscryptographically encrypted using a secret cryptographic “Volume UniqueKey. The Volume Unique Key is cryptographically derivable by anon-revoked AACS-compliant playback device based on a “Volume ID” and asecret cryptographic “Media Key”.

Typically, the Volume ID and the Media Key are stored on recorded mediasuch as, for example, a Blu-ray Disc, along with the encrypted contentand the encrypted Title Key. The secret Media Key is typically containedwith a “Media Key Block” issued by the AACS Licensing Administrator(AACS LA). The AACS LA is responsible for licensing AACS technology tomanufacturers who wish to market AACS-compliant playback devices toconsumers.

The Media Key Block is a component of a subset difference tree keymanagement system used in AACS. The Media Key Block is a data block thatprovides access to the secret Media Key. The secret Media Key in the MKBcan be accessed by any AACS-compliant device having “Device Keys” thathave not been revoked by the AACS LA. Like the Media Key Block andsecret Media Key, Device Keys are also assigned by the AACS LA toplayback device manufacturers to include in each compliant playbackdevice.

To generate the Volume Unique Key which can be used to decrypt theencrypted Title Key, a non-revoked AACS-compliant playback device usesits Device Keys to access the Media Key within the Media Key Block. Onethe Media Key is obtained from the Media Key Block, the playback devicecan generate the Volume Unique Key. In one embodiment, a non-revokedAACS-compliant playback device generates a Volume Unique Key by applyingan Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-based cryptographic one wayfunction to a Volume ID obtained from the removable media inserted intothe playback device and the Media Key obtained from the Media Key Block.

The Media Key Block is formatted in such a way that allows all compliantplayback devices, each using their set of secret Device Keys, tocalculate the secret Media Key using a known subset-difference treeapproach. With the subset-difference tree approach, if a playback deviceis compromised in a way that threatens the integrity of the AACS, theAACS LA can issue an updated Media Key Block that causes the compromisedplayback device to be unable to use the Media Key Block to calculate thecorrect secret Media Key. In this way, a playback device or a set ofplayback devices can be “revoked” because without the current Media Keya playback device will not be able to access the unencrypted form of theTitle Key necessary to decrypt AACS protected content.

While AACS may be sufficient to protect against unauthorized access toAACS protected content, AACS does not provide explicit mechanisms for acontent provider that delivers AACS protected content over a network toreliably authenticate clients that request the content or otherinformation. For example, there is no explicit mechanism provided byAACS that allows a content provider to reliably distinguish between an“authorized” client application executing on a non-revokedAACS-compliant playback device and other “unauthorized” applicationsexecuting in non-compliant or revoked environments.

A mechanism to reliably authenticate clients would be useful to acontent provider to ensure that it provides subscriber-specificinformation only to clients that can be reliably associated with aparticular subscriber. For example, continuing the subscription basedcontent provider example from above, in addition to developing a BD-JApplication that allows a subscriber to select content to download fromthe content provider, the content provider may wish to develop a BD-JApplication that also allows the subscriber to view, on his or her hometelevision screen, private subscription information such as, forexample, billing information or a listing of previously watched movies.In such a case, the content provider may wish to ensure that suchprivate information is delivered only to a client that can be reliablyassociated with the particular subscriber to which the personalinformation belongs.

Further, a mechanism to reliably distinguish between these environmentsmay also be useful to a content provider to ensure, for example, thatthe content provider provides AACS protected content only to non-revokedAACS-compliant playback devices.

AACS Permissions

Playback devices that support on-line connections and playback ofdownloaded AACS protected may implement “AACS Permissions”.

An AACS Permission is cryptographic data that specifies whether aplayback device is allowed to playback a title that requires an on-lineconnection to download content associated with the title (also known asan “enhanced title”). As used herein, the term “title”, unless otherwiseindicated, refers to a particular path through AACS protected content.AACS protected content such as a feature length movie may have more thanone path through it and hence more than one title. For example, onetitle might correspond to the movie as shown in the theaters and anothertitle might correspond to the full-featured version of the movie withsome extra scenes.

In one embodiment, an AACS permission may be created by a server duringcommunication between the playback device and the server. For example,the playback device may send a network request to the server thatrequests to play a certain title and also provides billing information.After verifying the billing information, the server may return an AACSPermission to the playback device which the playback device verifiesbefore playing back the content of the requested title.

AACS Layer

AACS-compliant playback devices that support playback of enhanced titlesmay implement a specified Application Programming Interface (API) in anAACS Layer of the playback device that allows a client applicationexecuting within the playback device to validate AACS Permissionsgenerated by a server. The AACS Layer is a secure layer within aplayback device that encapsulates AACS elements of the playback devicesuch as secret Device Keys and cryptographic algorithms used by AACS.The AACS Layer is secure in the sense that client applications executingon the playback device, for example Blu-ray Disc Java Applications, donot have direct access to the AACS elements encapsulated by the layerand must use the AACS Layer API to access the elements.

AACS Permission Validation

FIG. 1 illustrates, at a high-level, a client application's use of theAACS Layer API 100 to validate an AACS Permission. The dashed line inFIG. 1 represents the API between the client application and the AACSLayer in an AACS-compliant playback device. In one embodiment, theclient application is a Blu-ray Disc Java Application executing onBlu-ray Disc Player. Validating a permission using the AACS Layer APIproceeds generally as follows:

-   -   1. The client application executing on an AACS-compliant        playback device desires to play an enhanced title (being asked        to do by user interaction with the playback device). The client        application calls the AACS Layer passing an identifier (“Title        ID”) of the enhanced title it wants to play.    -   2. The AACS Layer generates a 128-bit random number (“Permission        Nonce”) and returns the Permission Nonce to the client        application. The client application sends the Permission Nonce        to a server together with any other information needed by the        server to determine whether permission to the play the enhanced        title should be granted such as, for example, the Title ID and        billing information.    -   3. If the server determines that permission should be granted,        the server generates a permission using the following        cryptographic formula, explained in greater detail below, and        sends the permission to the client application.        -   AES-128E (Kvu, [Permission Nonce]̂[Permission Data])            -   AES-128E—The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)                symmetric block cipher algorithm in Enhanced Codebook                mode of operation used with data blocks of 128 bits and                keys with lengths of 128 bits.            -   Kvu—A Volume Unique Key derived from the secret Media                Key and a Volume ID.            -   ̂—Bit-wise Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation.            -   [Permission Nonce]—The Permission Nonce generated in                Step 2 above.            -   [Permission Data]—Known or derivable information agreed                upon by the AACS Layer and the server such as, for                example, a Volume ID or a Title ID. The Permission Data                is XORed with the Permission Nonce and the result is                encrypted using the Volume Unique Key to generate the                permission.    -   4. Upon receiving the permission from the server, the client        application passes the permission to the AACS Layer which        validates the permission by calculating its own copy of the        permission using the formula in step 3 and comparing the        calculated permission with the permission received from the        server. If the permission received from the server and the        permission calculated by the AACS Layer match, the AACS Layer        indicates to the client application that the client application        has permission to play the enhanced title.

According to the formula in step 3 above, an AACS permission may begenerated by applying the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetricblock cipher algorithm in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode of operationusing a 128-bit Volume Unique Key (Kvu) to encrypt the bit-wiseExclusive-OR (XOR) of the Permission Nonce generated in step 2 and otherPermission Data. The format and content of the other Permission Data isagreed upon by the AACS Layer and the server and may include, amongother things, information exchanged between the client and the server aspart of the permission validation process. In one embodiment, thePermission Data is the result of an XOR of a particular Title Key withthe cryptographic hash of the bit-wise concatenation of a particularVolume ID and a particular Title ID. In one embodiment, the particularTitle Key is the unencrypted form of a particular Title Key and theparticular Volume ID and particular Title ID are obtained from theremovable media currently inserted into the playback device such as, forexample, a Blu-ray Disc inserted into an AACS-compliant Blu-ray DiscPlayer.

As explained above, the AACS Layer may obtain the secret Media Key bysuccessfully processing the Media Key Block. Playback devices that havenon-revoked Device Keys issued by the AACS LA can access the secretMedia Key in the Media Key Block. Therefore, playback devices that havenon-revoked Device Keys can generate the Volume Unique Key that is usedin the AACS permission formula. Thus, playback devices that havenon-revoked Device Keys can validate, in the AACS Layer, an AACSPermission using the AACS permission formula.

Revoking a Playback Device

The Media Key Block may be used to revoke an AACS-compliant playbackdevice's ability to decrypt encrypted title keys. The Media Key Blockrevocation mechanism can also revoke the playback device's ability tovalidate an AACS Permission. This is because, as explained previously,successfully validating an AACS Permission requires access to the secretMedia Key contained in the Media Key Block.

In one embodiment, to revoke a particular playback device or a group ofplayback devices, the AACS LA issues a new Media Key Block containing anew secret Media Key. The new Media Key Block can be composed, using thesubset difference tree key management system, in such a way that the setof Device Keys used by the particular playback device (or particulargroup of playback devices such as those made by a particularmanufacturer) can no longer access the secret Media Key.

In one embodiment, when a new Media Key Block is issued by the AACS LA,thereafter a content provider generates AACS Permissions based on thenew secret Media Key contained in the new Media Key Block. When a clientapplication requests permission to play an enhanced title, the serverresponds with an AACS Permission generated using the new secret MediaKey from the new Media Key Block. In one embodiment, the server alsoresponds with the new Media Key Block so that the playback device canaccess the new Media Key (provided the playback device is not revoked bythe new Media Key Block).

In one embodiment, the client application passes the new Media Key Blockto the AACS Layer when validating an AACS Permission. If the playbackdevice upon which the client application is executing has not beenrevoked by the new Media Key Block, then the AACS Layer can successfullyvalidate the AACS Permission using the new Media Key Block. If, however,the new Media Key Block revokes the Device Keys of the playback device,then the AACS Layer cannot successfully validate the AACS Permission.

While the AACS Permission scheme described above may permit a server togrant or deny permission to an AACS-compliant playback device to play anenhanced title, it does not protect the server from communicatingprotected information to revoked playback devices or even to clientapplications developed to “impersonate” an AACS-compliant playbackdevice. For example, a client application could be developed to executeon a desktop computer that does not have an AACS Layer and that“pretends” to validate an AACS Permission before playing back anenhanced title. This application could then request AACS protectedcontent or other information from the server under the guise that it isa non-revoked AACS-compliant playback device with “permission” to playback an enhanced title. Before providing AACS protected content orprivate information to a client application, it would be useful for theserver to authenticate that, in fact, the client application isexecuting on a non-revoked AACS-compliant playback device.

Using AACS Permissions for Client Authentication

FIG. 2 is a flowchart that illustrates a process 200 for authenticatinga non-revoked AACS-compliant playback device using AACS Permissions,according to an embodiment of the invention. In general, a server mayreliably authenticate a non-revoked AACS-compliant playback device bysending, for each of a series of Permission Nonces received from aclient application, either (1) a valid permission generated using theAACS Permission formula or (2) a bogus authentication permission whichappears to be a valid permission but is not in fact valid. As usedherein, the term “authentication permission” refers to both a valid AACSPermission and a bogus permission. The server then observes which of theauthentication permissions sent to the client application the clientapplication indicates are valid authentication permissions. Since anon-revoked AACS-compliant playback device can calculate a valid AACSPermission using the AACS Permission formula, a non-revokedAACS-compliant playback device can tell the difference between a validauthentication permission and a bogus authentication permission. If theclient application correctly indicates to the server which of the seriesof authentication permissions are valid authentication permissions thenthe server has authenticated the client application as executing on anon-revoked AACS-compliant playback device. Otherwise, the serverassumes that the client application is executing on a revoked device orin a non-AACS-compliant environment.

Referring to FIG. 2, initially, server 201 assumes that any clientapplication 204 that initiates a communication session with server 201is unauthenticated. In one embodiment, process 200 is performed beforeclient application 204 attempts to obtain permission from server 201 toplay an enhanced title. Both server 201 and client application 204 maycomprise one or more sequences of computer-executable instructions whichwhen executed by a processor perform the server-side and client-side ofprocess 200 respectively.

Steps 210, 220, 230, 240, and 250 of process 200 define a loop 280 thatis repeated N times by the client application 204 and server 201 withthe purpose of generating sufficient authentication data upon whichserver 201 can make an authentication decision in step 270. For thepurpose of discussion, the data upon which server 201 makes anauthentication decision in step 270 is referred to herein as “clientauthentication data.”

Three approaches are described for generating client authenticationdata. However, process 200 is not limited to any particular approach forgenerating client authentication data and other approaches may besubstituted within the spirit and scope of the invention. Further, thethree approached described below are not exclusive of one another andmay be combined in any combination within the spirit and scope of theinvention.

In a first approach for generating client authentication data, server201 sends a bogus authentication permission in step 240 in each of thefirst N-1 iterations of loop 280, where N is selected randomly by server201 and is unknown to client application 204. Then, during the N-thiteration of the loop, server 201 sends a valid authenticationpermission in step 240. Server 201 authenticates client application 204based on whether client application 204 ceases to send a PermissionNonce in step 220 following the N-th iteration of the loop. If clientapplication 204 stops sending a Permission Nonce in step 220 prior tothe N-th iteration of the loop or sends a Permission Nonce after theN-th iteration, then server 201 determines that the client application204 is executing on a revoked or non-compliant playback device. If,however, client application 204 stops sending a Permission Nonce in step220 immediately after the N-th iteration of loop 280, then the server201 has authenticated client application 204 as executing in anon-revoked AACS-compliant environment. Server 201 makes thisauthentication decision on the assumption that only a non-revokedAACS-compliant playback device can tell, by validating theauthentication permission using the API of AACS Layer 206, that the N-thauthentication permission is a valid authentication permission.

In a second approach for generating client authentication data, thevalue of N is known to both server 201 and client application 204 andserver 201 distributes sending bogus authentication permissions andvalid authentication permissions in step 240 over the N iterations ofloop 280 in a random manner. This effectively creates an N-bit randomnumber that the client application 204 can decipher only by correctlydetermining when server 201 sent a bogus authentication permission andwhen server 201 sent a valid authentication permission during the Niterations of the loop.

Continuing the second approach, after the N iterations of loop 280,client application 204, in optional step 260, returns a bit pattern ofN-bits representing when client application 204 determined it received abogus authentication permission and when client application 204determined it received a valid authentication permission. For example,client application 204 may return an N-bit datum in which the i-th bitis 0 if the client application 204 determined that is received a bogusauthentication permission during the i-th iteration of loop 280 and inwhich the i-th bit is 1 if client application 204 determined that itreceived a valid authentication permission during the i-th iteration ofthe loop. Server 201 may authenticate client application 204 in step 270by comparing the received bit pattern to when it actually sent bogusauthentication permissions and valid authentication permissions duringthe N iterations of the loop.

In a third approach for generating client authentication data, loop 280is performed once at regular time intervals, for example, once every 2hours. This approach forces client application 204 to renewauthentication over a period of time such as, for example, while theplayback device executing client application 204 is powered on andconnected to server 201.

In one embodiment, to prevent a malicious client application 204 fromcausing server 201 to “tell” which of the authentication permissions arevalid authentication permissions and which are bogus authenticationpermissions, server 201 stores up to the last N Permission Nonces sentby client application 204 in step 220. If Client Application 204 repeatsa permission nonce as indicated by the Permission Nonces stored by theserver, then server 201 may to refuse to authenticate client application204.

Generating an Authentication Permission

In each of the N iterations of loop 280 of process 200, server 201generates, in step 230, either a valid authentication permission usingthe AACS Permission Formula or a bogus authentication permission. Forexample, during the i-th iteration of the loop, if server 201 determinesthat a valid authentication permission should be generated according toone of the three approaches described above, then server 201 generates avalid authentication permission using the AACS permission formula andthe Permission Nonce received in step 220 during that iteration (i.e.,the i-th iteration) of the loop. Alternatively, if server 201 determinesthat a bogus authentication permission should be generated, then server201 generates a random number or pseudo-random number of length equal tothe length of a valid authentication permission. In one embodiment, boththe valid authentication permissions and the bogus authenticationpermissions are 16-bytes in length.

Authentication of Revoked Playback Devices

If the AACS Licensing Administrator (AACS LA) issues a new Media KeyBlock (MKB) that revokes Device Keys of an AACS-compliant playbackdevice, server 201 can generate valid authentication permissions usingthe new Media Key of the new Media Key Block in step 230. In addition togenerating authentication permissions using the new Media Key Block,server 201 may send the new Media Key Block containing the new Media Keyto client application 204 in step 240. The AACS Layer 206 on anAACS-compliant device using Device Keys revoked by the new Media KeyBlock will be unable to verify valid authentication permissions sentfrom server 201. Thus, revoked playback devices will be unable todistinguish between valid authentication permissions and bogusauthentication permissions.

In one embodiment, sever 201 sends the current Media Key Block each timeit performs step 240 of process 200. In another embodiment, server 201provides client application 204 with the current Media Key Block in acommunication exchange prior to entering the loop of process 200. In oneembodiment, client application 204 passes a new Media Key Block receivedfrom server 201 to AACS Layer 206 using the AACS Layer API. In oneembodiment, client application 204 passes the new Media Key Block toAACS Layer 206 in step 250 when client application 204 requests the AACSLayer 206 to validate an authentication permission.

In some AACS-compliant playback devices, for example, Blu-ray DiscPlayers, the AACS Layer API does not provide an API so that a clientapplication such as client application 204 can provide a new Media KeyBlock sent from a server such as server 201. These playback devices onlyobtain the Media Key Block from removable media currently inserted intothe playback device. Accordingly, in one embodiment, when the AACSLicensing Administrator (AACS LA) issues a new Media Key Block, thecontent provider issues new removable media to content subscribers thatinclude the new Media Key Block. Playback devices using the old MediaKey Block and revoked playback devices will be unable to successfullyauthenticate with server 201.

Exemplary Client-Server Environment

FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary client-server environment 300 in whichprocess 200 may be implemented. Environment 300 includes server computersystem 301 communicatively coupled to playback device 302 via a datanetwork such as the Internet. Server computer system 301 represents oneor more computer systems which are configured to implement server-sideclient authentication logic 303 and database 305. In one embodiment,server-side client authentication logic 303 implements that server sideof process 200. Database 305 maintains data necessary to carry out theserver-side steps of process 200. Database 305 may also maintain otherdata for other applications hosted or implemented by server computersystem 301.

Playback device 302 comprises client-side client authentication logic304, AACS Layer Logic 306, local storage 308, and optionally, subscriberkey disc 310 inserted into player 302. For the purpose of illustrating aclear example, FIG. 3 shows one playback device 302, but in a practicalembodiment there may be many thousands of playback devices 302concurrently served by server computer system 301. In one embodiment,playback device 302 is any AACS-compliant playback device that includesAACS Layer Logic 306. In one embodiment, playback device 302 is anAACS-compliant Blu-ray Disc Player.

Each of the server computer system 301, playback device 302, server-sideclient authentication logic 303, client-side client authentication logic304, and AACS Layer logic 306 may be implemented in various embodimentsusing a computer, one or more application-specific integrated circuits(ASICs) or other digital electronic logic, one or more computerprograms, modules, objects, methods, or other software elements. Forexample, in one embodiment, server computer system 301 and playbackdevice 302 may each comprise a special-purpose computer havingparticular logic configured to implement the respective elements andfunctions described herein. In another embodiment, server computersystem 301 and playback device 302 may comprise a general purposecomputer as in FIG. 6, loaded with one or more stored programs withtransform the general purpose computer into a particular machine uponloading and execution.

In one embodiment, playback device 302 may have a central processingunit (CPU) for executing instructions of client-side clientauthentication logic 304. In one embodiment, client-side clientauthentication logic 304 is implemented as a Blu-ray Disc JavaApplication. In one embodiment, client-side client authentication logic304 comprises one or more sequences of computer executable instructionsfor performing the client-side steps of process 200. In addition,client-side client authentication logic 304 may also compriseinstructions for providing various subscription services such as, forexample, allowing a subscriber to select, download, and view AACSprotected content or manage personal subscription information such as,for example, billing information, personal movie preferences, moviequeue information, and the like.

In one embodiment, the instructions comprising client-side clientauthentication logic 304 are stored on a non-volatile memory of player302 such as, for example, on a hard disk or flash memory of player 302.In another embodiment, instructions comprising client-side clientauthentication logic 304 may be read by player 302 from a removablenon-volatile computer-readable storage medium inserted into player 302such as, for example, a Blu-ray Disc. In another embodiment,instructions comprising client-side client authentication logic 304 maybe received over data network from a server such as server computersystem 301.

In one embodiment, client-side client authentication logic 304 isimplemented as two applications: (1) a bootstrap application stored inthe firmware of player 302 or on a Blu-ray Disc which, when executed byplayer 302, contacts a server to download the latest version of (2) thesecond application that comprises the most up-to-date instructions forperforming the client-side steps of process 200.

In one embodiment, AACS Layer Logic 306 is a secure AACS-compliantsub-system of player 302 that provides the AACS Layer API as describedin the AACS specification.

Local storage or memory 308 is a hard disk or flash memory for storingfiles; including AACS protected content downloaded from servers.

Subscriber Key Disc

As explained above, AACS Layer Logic 306 uses a Volume ID whengenerating the Volume Unique Key. Also as explained above, the VolumeUnique Key is used by both the server and client in the AACS permissionformula when generating and validating permissions respectively. In oneembodiment, the Volume ID is assigned by a content provider to AACSprotected content to uniquely identify a title or a set of titles.

In one embodiment, to successfully validate a valid authenticationpermission, AACS Layer Logic 306 may use the same Volume ID thatserver-side client authentication logic 303 used to generate the validauthentication permission. AACS Layer Logic 306 in a Blu-ray DiscPlayer, when generating the Volume Unique Key, may obtain the Volume IDfrom the Blu-ray Disc currently inserted into the player such as, forexample, subscriber key disc 310 inserted into player 302 of FIG. 3.Further, the Volume ID may be stored on the Blu-ray Disc in a way thatcannot be duplicated by consumer Blu-ray recording devices so as toprevent indiscriminate copying of Blu-ray Discs. To preventindiscriminate copying, the Volume ID may be stored in the Burst CuttingArea of the Blu-ray Disc. The Burst Cutting Area is a special area of aBlu-ray Disc that can only be recorded with data using a specializedexpensive laser that is generally not commercially available.

In addition to the Volume ID, the Burst Cutting Area of Blu-ray Discsmay also contain a Pre-recorded Media Serial Number (PMSN). The PMSNrecorded on a Blu-ray Disc may be a 128-bit number of which 104 of thosebits may be unique. The Volume ID may not be unique for each Blu-rayDisc as the Volume ID is typically associated with an AACS title or setof titles independent of the medium the content of the title or titlesis stored on. However, the PMSN may be unique for each Blu-ray Disc. TheAACS Layer API on AACS-compliant Blu-ray Players may provide aninterface for a client application such as client-side clientauthentication logic 304 to obtain the Volume ID and the PMSN from thecurrently inserted Blu-ray Disc.

In one embodiment, a content provider uses information recorded in theBurst Cutting Area of Blu-ray Discs to aid the content provider inregistering subscribers for services. In the embodiment, the contentprovider provides a Blu-ray Disc (“subscriber key disc”) to eachsubscriber. Each key disc contains a unique key disc identifier in the104 bit portion of the PMSN. At least two particular features of thePMSN make using the PMSN especially suitable for use in registeringsubscribers. First, 104 bits of the 128-bit PMSN may contain a randomnumber assigned by the content provider making guessing a subscriberidentifier difficult as there would be 2¹⁰⁴ or 2.02824096×10³¹ differentpossible key disc identifiers. Second, since the PMSN is recorded in theBurst Cutting Area of a Blu-ray Disc which cannot be copied withoutspecialized expensive equipment, a subscriber or other person inpossession of a subscriber key disc cannot practically makeindiscriminate copies of a key disc to gift or sell to others.

Activating Streaming Video in a Blu-Ray Disc Player Using Subscriber KeyDiscs

FIG. 4 is a flow diagram that illustrates a process 400 for activatingstreaming video in a Blu-ray Disc Player using the client authenticationprocess 200 of FIG. 2 and s subscriber key disc according to anembodiment of the invention. Process 400 is an example of a practicalembodiment of the invention in which a subscription-based contentprovider authenticates subscriber-owned Blu-ray Disc Players connectedto the content provider through a data network such as the Internet.Process 400 is merely an example of a practical embodiment of theinvention and should be regarded in an illustrative rather than arestrictive sense.

In one embodiment, process 400 begins with the content providergenerating one or more key discs 310 that include computer-executableinstructions comprising a Blu-ray Disc Java (BD-J) Application orbootstrap code for obtaining instructions of BD-J Application from aserver such as server 301 of FIG. 3. In addition, each key disc 310contains in the Burst Cutting Area a Pre-Recorded Media Serial Number(PMSN) and a Volume Identifier (Volume ID). The Volume ID may or may notbe unique for each key disc at the content provider's discretion.

For each key disc, a portion of the PMSN may contain a unique randomnumber up to 104 bits in length. In one embodiment, the content providerplaces a unique key disc identifier in the 104 bit portion of the PMSNthat uniquely identifies each generated key disc. In one embodiment,each unique key disc identifier comprises a disc identifying portion anda keying material portion. In another embodiment, the unique key discidentifier does not comprise a keying material portion and keyingmaterial data is stored in the Burst Cutting Area of the key discseparately from the PMSN. When communicating with server logic 303,client logic 304 sends the disc identifying portion to uniquely identifythe key disc currently inserted into playback device 302. In oneembodiment, the key material portion is used by client logic 304 forcryptographic message authentication (e.g., as a key for calculating aHash Message Authentication Code) when communicating with server logic303.

In step 401, a subscriber record is created in database 305 forgenerated key discs. Each subscriber record may be uniquely identifiableby the key disc identifier of the corresponding key disc. Further, whencreated, the subscriber record may be set to an initial state such as,for example, “unregistered” that indicates that no attempt has been madeas of yet to use the corresponding key disc to activate streaming videoin a Blu-ray Disc Player. Optionally, each subscriber record may containdata that is unique to, or is to be associated with, the key discidentifier recorded in the corresponding key disc. For example, if thecontent provider chooses to create key discs with unique Volume IDs,then each subscriber record in database 305 may contain the Volume IDrecorded into the Burst Cutting Area of the corresponding key disc. Inaddition, any information that is useful to associate with the key discidentifier such as, for example, any information needed by server-sideclient authentication logic 303 to generate a valid AACS Permission fora particular key disc, may also be stored in a subscriber record to beassociated with the particular key disc.

In step 403, a subscriber receives a key disc containing a unique keydisc identifier. The subscriber inserts the key disc into playbackdevice 302, and powers-on the player 302. This causes player 302 tobegin execution of client logic 304.

While step 401 is shown in the embodiment depicted in FIG. 4 as beingperformed prior to step 409, in one embodiment, step 401 is performedafter step 409. In particular, in one embodiment, a subscriber record iscreated when client 304 contacts server 303 in step 409 for the firsttime after receiving a key disc in step 403.

In step 405, client logic 304 invokes the AACS Layer API of AACS LayerLogic 306 to obtain the Pre-recorded Serial Number (PMSN) of thecurrently inserted key disc. The notation “MediaAttribute.getPMSN( )” ofstep 405 in FIG. 4 is pseudo-code that refers to a function call of thegetPMSN( ) function on an instance of the MediaAttribute class of theobject-oriented AACS Layer API in a Blu-ray Disc Player. The AACS LayerAPI of AACS Layer Logic 306 in Blu-ray Disc Players is described indetail in Chapter 4 of the Blu-ray Disc Pre-recorded Book of the AACSSpecification. Steps 407 and 417 of FIG. 4 contain similar notation tothat of step 405 and also refer to a function call on an instance of aclass of AACS Layer API of AACS Layer Logic 306.

Steps 407, 409, 413, 415, and 417 of process 400 generally correspond tosteps 210, 220, 230, 240, and 250 of process 200 respectively exceptthat in step 409, client logic 304 sends the PMSN (or the key discidentifying portion thereof) obtained from the inserted key disc toserver 303 along with the Permission Nonce obtained from AACS Layerlogic 306 in step 407. Step 419 corresponds generally to step 260 ofprocess 200 and step 421 corresponds generally to step 270 of process200.

In optional step 411, server-side client authentication logic 303 canuse the PMSN (or the key disc identifying portion thereof) sent fromBD-J Application 304 in step 409 to retrieve the subscriber record fromdatabase 305 that corresponds to the key disc identifier containedwithin the PMSN. In one embodiment, data in the retrieved subscriberrecord such as, for example, a Volume ID, is used by server-side clientauthentication logic 303 in step 413 to generate an authenticationpermission. In one embodiment, server-side client authentication logic303 in step 411 retrieves the subscriber record during the firstiteration of the client authentication loop 425 to determine whether thekey disc as identified by the key disc identifier received in step 409has already attempted to activate streaming video. In one embodiment,step 411 is performed once during the first iteration of loop 425.

In step 421, server-side client authentication logic 303 makes anauthentication decision based on client authentication data generated bythe execution of loop 425.

In step 423, server-side client authentication logic 303 updates thesubscriber record based on the authentication decision made in step 421.For example, if in step 421 server-side client authentication logic 303determines that client application 304 is not authenticated (e.g., isnot executing on a non-revoked AACS-compliant Blu-ray Disc Player), thenserver-side client authentication logic 303 may update the subscriberrecord to indicate that BD-J Application 304 is not authenticated andshould not receive other service data from server 301. Such service datamay include, for example, history data about previously watched moviesor billing information associated with a subscriber.

However, if in step 421 server-side client authentication logic 303determines that client logic 304 is authenticated, then server-sideclient authentication logic 303 may update the subscriber record toindicate that client logic 304 is authenticated and is permitted toreceive service data from server 301 such as, for example, streamingvideo content, content viewing history, billing information, and thelike. Additionally, server-side client authentication logic 303 or otherapplications executing on server 301 may use the key disc identifier toensure that sensitive subscriber-specific data such as, for example,billing information, is sent only to an authenticated client logic 304that has proven ownership of a valid key disc identifier. In oneembodiment, ownership of a valid key disc identifier is “proven” byclient logic 304 having been successfully authenticated by server-sideclient authentication logic 303 according to process 400.

Key Disc/Device Subscriber Binding

In process 400 depicted by FIG. 4, each subscriber is uniquelyidentified by a key disc identifier stored in the key disc issued to thesubscriber. This implies that server 303 can authenticate client 304executing on more than one playback device 302. For example, asubscriber might have multiple playback devices in a home such as, forexample, one in the living room and one in the bedroom. The key disc maybe used in any of the home's multiple playback devices to authenticateclient 304 and obtain subscription services. However, the contentprovider may wish to restrict the number of playback devices that thesubscriber may use. For example, a content provider may wish to preventa subscriber from allowing non-subscribers to obtain subscriptionservices by borrowing the subscriber's key disc to use in their ownplayback devices.

Accordingly, FIG. 5 is a flow diagram that illustrates a process 500 foractivating streaming video in a Blu-ray Disc Player in which thesubscriber record is bound to a key disc and a specified number of playback devices. Process 500 proceeds generally as process 400 depicted inFIG. 4 except that in new step 501 of process 500, client logic 304calls the AACS layer API function “DeviceAttribute.getBindingID( )”which returns a value that uniquely identifies playback device 302. Inone embodiment, the value is a random number 16 -bytes in length.Further, in step 409 of process 500, client logic 304 sends to server303 the device binding value along with the PMSN (or the key discidentifying portion thereof) obtained from the inserted key disc and thePermission Nonce obtained from AACS Layer logic 306 in step 407.

Server 303 may use the unique device binding value to track the numberof different playback devices 302 in which a particular key disc hasbeen used to activate streaming video. Through this tracking, thecontent provider may limit the number of different playback devices 302that can be activated to receive subscription services by the particularkey disc. In one embodiment, the subscriber record created in step 401is uniquely identified by the PMSN (or the key disc identifying portionthereof) and also stores one or more device binding identifiers receivedin step 409 to aid server 303 in tracking the number of differentplayback devices 302 for which a particular key disc has been used toactivate streaming video.

Revocation Using Subscriber Key Discs

In one embodiment, when the AASC LA issues a new Media Key Block, thecontent provider generates new key discs each with unique PMSNscontaining the new Media Key Block and sends the new key discs tocurrent subscribers and all future subscribers. Thereafter, server logic303, in step 413 of process 400 and process 500, generates validauthentication permissions using the new Media Key Block. Players 302using a key disc with an old Media Key Block will not be able tosuccessfully authenticate with server 303 which is now using the newMedia Key Block to generate valid authentication permissions. In oneembodiment, server logic 303 refuses to authenticate any client 304 thatpresents in step 409 a PMSN (or the key disc identifying portionthereof) that indicates that a key disc with an old Media Key Block isinserted into the playback device 302.

Pseudo-Code for BD-J Application

In this section, a pseudo-code example is given of how a contentprovider might actually design client logic 304 as a Blu-ray Disc JavaApplication for activating streaming video in a Blu-ray Disc Player.However, it should be noted that the syntax, operators, etc. used inthis example is merely exemplary. The actual language, format, syntaxfor designing client logic 304 may vary from implementation toimplementation.

For the purpose of illustration, the pseudo-code illustrates how clientlogic 304 as a Blu-ray Disc Java Application would accomplish clientauthentication using AACS permissions according to one embodiment of theinvention.

// get PMSN MediaAttribute mAttr = new MediaAttribute( ); byte[ ] pmsn =mAttr.getPMSN( ); // get Device Binding Nonce DeviceAttribute dAttr =new DeviceAttribute( ); byte[ ] deviceBindingNonce =dAttr.getDeviceBindingID( ); // loop until we get a success boolean ok =false; // TBD: deal with max retries while(! ok) {    // create an AACSpermission    EnablePermission p = new EnablePermission(title_id);   byte[ ] permissionNonce = p.getNonce( );    // client retrievespermission from the server over HTTPS    HttpsConnection conn =(HttpsConnection)Connector.open(url);    // send POST containing: pmsn,deviceBindingNonce and    permissionNonce    // ...    // getInputStream to read response    InputStream is = conn.openInputStream();    // etc...    byte[ ] permission = is.read( );    // Bind usingreturned AACS permission    p.setPermission(permission)    ok =p.checkPermission( ); }

Hardware Overview

According to one embodiment, the techniques described herein areimplemented by one or more special-purpose computing devices. Thespecial-purpose computing devices may be hard-wired to perform thetechniques, or may include digital electronic devices such as one ormore application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) or fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGAs) that are persistently programmed toperform the techniques, or may include one or more general purposehardware processors programmed to perform the techniques pursuant toprogram instructions in firmware, memory, other storage, or acombination. Such special-purpose computing devices may also combinecustom hard-wired logic, ASICs, or FPGAs with custom programming toaccomplish the techniques. The special-purpose computing devices may bedesktop computer systems, portable computer systems, handheld devices,networking devices or any other device that incorporates hard-wiredand/or program logic to implement the techniques.

For example, FIG. 6 is a block diagram that illustrates a computersystem 600 upon which an embodiment of the invention may be implemented.Computer system 600 includes a bus 602 or other communication mechanismfor communicating information, and a hardware processor 604 coupled withbus 602 for processing information. Hardware processor 604 may be, forexample, a general purpose microprocessor.

Computer system 600 also includes a main memory 606, such as a randomaccess memory (RAM) or other dynamic storage device, coupled to bus 602for storing information and instructions to be executed by processor604. Main memory 606 also may be used for storing temporary variables orother intermediate information during execution of instructions to beexecuted by processor 604. Such instructions, when stored in storagemedia accessible to processor 604, render computer system 600 into aspecial-purpose machine that is customized to perform the operationsspecified in the instructions.

Computer system 600 further includes a read only memory (ROM) 608 orother static storage device coupled to bus 602 for storing staticinformation and instructions for processor 604. A storage device 610,such as a magnetic disk or optical disk, is provided and coupled to bus602 for storing information and instructions.

Computer system 600 may be coupled via bus 602 to a display 612, such asa cathode ray tube (CRT), for displaying information to a computer user.An input device 614, including alphanumeric and other keys, is coupledto bus 602 for communicating information and command selections toprocessor 604. Another type of user input device is cursor control 616,such as a mouse, a trackball, or cursor direction keys for communicatingdirection information and command selections to processor 604 and forcontrolling cursor movement on display 612. This input device typicallyhas two degrees of freedom in two axes, a first axis (e.g., x) and asecond axis (e.g., y), that allows the device to specify positions in aplane.

Computer system 600 may implement the techniques described herein usingcustomized hard-wired logic, one or more ASICs or FPGAs, firmware and/orprogram logic which in combination with the computer system causes orprograms computer system 600 to be a special-purpose machine. Accordingto one embodiment, the techniques herein are performed by computersystem 600 in response to processor 604 executing one or more sequencesof one or more instructions contained in main memory 606. Suchinstructions may be read into main memory 606 from another storagemedium, such as storage device 610. Execution of the sequences ofinstructions contained in main memory 606 causes processor 604 toperform the process steps described herein. In alternative embodiments,hard-wired circuitry may be used in place of or in combination withsoftware instructions.

The term “storage media” as used herein refers to any media that storedata and/or instructions that cause a machine to operation in a specificfashion. Such storage media may comprise non-volatile media and/orvolatile media. Non-volatile media includes, for example, optical ormagnetic disks, such as storage device 610. Volatile media includesdynamic memory, such as main memory 606. Common forms of storage mediainclude, for example, a floppy disk, a flexible disk, hard disk, solidstate drive, magnetic tape, or any other magnetic data storage medium, aCD-ROM, any other optical data storage medium, any physical medium withpatterns of holes, a RAM, a PROM, and EPROM, a FLASH-EPROM, NVRAM, anyother memory chip or cartridge.

Storage media is distinct from but may be used in conjunction withtransmission media. Transmission media participates in transferringinformation between storage media. For example, transmission mediaincludes coaxial cables, copper wire and fiber optics, including thewires that comprise bus 602. Transmission media can also take the formof acoustic or light waves, such as those generated during radio-waveand infra-red data communications.

Various forms of media may be involved in carrying one or more sequencesof one or more instructions to processor 604 for execution. For example,the instructions may initially be carried on a magnetic disk or solidstate drive of a remote computer. The remote computer can load theinstructions into its dynamic memory and send the instructions over atelephone line using a modem. A modem local to computer system 600 canreceive the data on the telephone line and use an infra-red transmitterto convert the data to an infra-red signal. An infra-red detector canreceive the data carried in the infra-red signal and appropriatecircuitry can place the data on bus 602. Bus 602 carries the data tomain memory 606, from which processor 604 retrieves and executes theinstructions. The instructions received by main memory 606 mayoptionally be stored on storage device 610 either before or afterexecution by processor 604.

Computer system 600 also includes a communication interface 618 coupledto bus 602. Communication interface 618 provides a two-way datacommunication coupling to a network link 620 that is connected to alocal network 622. For example, communication interface 618 may be anintegrated services digital network (ISDN) card, cable modem, satellitemodem, or a modem to provide a data communication connection to acorresponding type of telephone line. As another example, communicationinterface 618 may be a local area network (LAN) card to provide a datacommunication connection to a compatible LAN. Wireless links may also beimplemented. In any such implementation, communication interface 618sends and receives electrical, electromagnetic or optical signals thatcarry digital data streams representing various types of information.

Network link 620 typically provides data communication through one ormore networks to other data devices. For example, network link 620 mayprovide a connection through local network 622 to a host computer 624 orto data equipment operated by an Internet Service Provider (ISP) 626.ISP 626 in turn provides data communication services through the worldwide packet data communication network now commonly referred to as the“Internet” 628. Local network 622 and Internet 628 both use electrical,electromagnetic or optical signals that carry digital data streams. Thesignals through the various networks and the signals on network link 620and through communication interface 618, which carry the digital data toand from computer system 600, are example forms of transmission media.

Computer system 600 can send messages and receive data, includingprogram code, through the network(s), network link 620 and communicationinterface 618. In the Internet example, a server 630 might transmit arequested code for an application program through Internet 628, ISP 626,local network 622 and communication interface 618.

The received code may be executed by processor 604 as it is received,and/or stored in storage device 610, or other non-volatile storage forlater execution.

In the foregoing specification, embodiments of the invention have beendescribed with reference to numerous specific details that may vary fromimplementation to implementation. Thus, the sole and exclusive indicatorof what is the invention, and is intended by the applicants to be theinvention, is the set of claims that issue from this application, in thespecific form in which such claims issue, including any subsequentcorrection. Any definitions expressly set forth herein for termscontained in such claims shall govern the meaning of such terms as usedin the claims. Hence, no limitation, element, property, feature,advantage or attribute that is not expressly recited in a claim shouldlimit the scope of such claim in any way. The specification and drawingsare, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative rather than arestrictive sense.

1. In a server computer system, a method for authenticating a clientcomputer system using Advanced Access Content System (AACS)cryptographic elements, the method comprising: receiving a plurality ofpermission nonces from said client computer system; generating aplurality of authentication permissions and sending the plurality ofauthentication permissions to said client computer system; wherein atleast one of said authentication permissions is generated using anAdvanced Access Content System (AACS) cryptographic key and one of saidplurality of permissions nonces; and authenticating said client computersystem based at least in part on whether said client computer systemindicates to said server computer system that said at least one of saidauthentication permissions was generated using said AACS cryptographickey and said one of said plurality of permissions nonces.
 2. The methodof claim 1, wherein said client computer system comprises a Blu-ray DiscJava Application executing on a Blu-ray Disc Playback Device.
 3. Themethod of claim 1, wherein said cryptographic key is a volume unique keygenerated based on a volume identifier and an Advanced Access ContentSystem media key.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein at least one of saidplurality of authentication permissions is a bogus authenticationpermission.
 5. The method of claim 1, further comprising: storing saidplurality of permission nonces; determining whether any of saidplurality of permission nonces are duplicates; and whereinauthenticating said client computer system is based at least in part ondetermining whether any of said plurality of permission nonces areduplicates.
 6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: receiving adisc identifier that uniquely identifies a removable optical diskinserted into said client computer system; and using said discidentifier to determine whether said removable optical disk has beenpreviously used for authenticating a client computer system.
 7. Themethod of claim 1, further comprising: receiving a disc identifier thatuniquely identifies a removable optical disk inserted into said clientcomputer system; receiving a device identifier that uniquely identifiessaid client computer system; and using said disc identifier and saiddevice identifier to determine whether said removable optical disk hasbeen previously used in said client computer system for authenticating aclient computer system.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein said clientcomputer system indicates to said server computer system that said atleast one of said authentication permissions was generated using saidAdvanced Access Content System (AACS) cryptographic key and said one ofsaid plurality of permissions nonces by performing the steps of:generating a particular authentication permission using said AACScryptographic key and said one of said plurality of permissions nonces;determining whether said particular authentication permission is thesame as said at least one of said authentication permissions; andsending an indication to said server computer system that saidparticular authentication permission is the same as said at least one ofsaid authentication permissions.
 9. A computer-readable storage mediumhaving processor-executable instructions for performing the method ofclaim
 1. 10. In a client computer system, a method for authenticatingsaid client computer system using Advanced Access Content System (AACS)cryptographic elements, the method comprising: sending a plurality ofpermissions nonces to a server computer system and receiving a pluralityof authentication permissions from said server computer system; whereinat least one authentication permission of said plurality ofauthentication permissions is generated by said server computer systemusing an Advanced Access Content System (AACS) cryptographic key and oneof said plurality of permissions nonces; verifying that said at leastone authentication permission was generated using said AACScryptographic key and said one of said plurality of permissions nonces.11. The method of claim 10, wherein said client computer systemcomprises a Blu-ray Disc Java Application executing on a Blu-ray DiscPlayback Device.
 12. The method of claim 10, wherein said cryptographickey is a volume unique key generated based on a volume identifier and anAdvanced Access Content System (AACS) media key.
 13. The method of claim10, wherein at least one of said plurality of authentication permissionsis a bogus authentication permission.
 14. The method of claim 10,further comprising: sending a disc identifier that uniquely identifies aremovable optical disk inserted into said client computer system; andwherein said disc identifier is obtained from an Advanced Access ContentSystem (AACS) layer of said client computer system.
 15. The method ofclaim 10, further comprising: sending a disc identifier that uniquelyidentifies a removable optical disk inserted into said client computersystem; sending a device identifier that uniquely identifies said clientcomputer system; and wherein said disc identifier and said deviceidentifier are obtained from an Advanced Access Content System (AACS)layer of said client computer system.
 16. The method of claim 10,wherein the step of verifying that said at least one authenticationpermission was generated using said AACS cryptographic key and said oneof said plurality of permissions nonces comprises the steps of:generating a particular authentication permission using said AACScryptographic key and said one of said plurality of permissions nonces;and determining whether said particular authentication permission is thesame as said at least one of said authentication permissions.
 17. Acomputer-readable storage medium having processor-executableinstructions for performing the method of claim
 10. 18. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of said claim 17, wherein saidcomputer-readable storage medium is a Blu-ray Disc.
 19. A clientcomputer system for authenticating said client computer system usingAdvanced Access Content System (AACS) cryptographic elements, the clientcomputer system comprising: one or more processors; a network interfacecapable of being configured to couple to a data network; and logicencoded in one or more computer-readable media wherein execution by theone or more processors causes: sending a plurality of permissions noncesto a server computer system and receiving a plurality of authenticationpermissions from said server computer system; wherein at least oneauthentication permission of said plurality of authenticationpermissions is generated by said server computer system using anAdvanced Access Content System (AACS) cryptographic key and one of saidplurality of permissions nonces; verifying that said at least oneauthentication permission was generated using said AACS cryptographickey and said one of said plurality of permissions nonces.
 20. The clientcomputer system of claim 19, wherein said client computer systemcomprises a Blu-ray Disc Java Application executing on a Blu-ray DiscPlayback Device.
 21. The client computer system of claim 19, whereinsaid cryptographic key is a volume unique key generated based on avolume identifier and an Advanced Access Content System (AACS) mediakey.
 22. The client computer system of claim 19, wherein at least one ofsaid plurality of authentication permissions is a bogus authenticationpermission.
 23. The client computer system of claim 19, wherein saidlogic is further operable to cause: sending a disc identifier thatuniquely identifies a removable optical disk inserted into said clientcomputer system; and wherein said disc identifier is obtained from anAdvanced Access Content System (AACS) layer of said client computersystem.
 24. The client computer system of claim 19, wherein said logicis further operable to cause: sending a disc identifier that uniquelyidentifies a removable optical disk inserted into said client computersystem; sending a device identifier that uniquely identifies said clientcomputer system; and wherein said disc identifier and said deviceidentifier are obtained from an Advanced Access Content System (AACS)layer of said client computer system.
 25. The client computer system ofclaim 19, wherein the logic operable to cause verifying that said atleast one authentication permission was generated using said AdvancedAccess Content System (AACS) cryptographic key and said one of saidplurality of permissions nonces is further operable to cause: generatinga particular authentication permission using said AACS cryptographic keyand said one of said plurality of permissions nonces; and determiningwhether said particular authentication permission is the same as said atleast one of said authentication permissions.
 26. A system forauthenticating a client computer system using Advanced Access ContentSystem (AACS) cryptographic elements, the system comprising: a servercomputer system; and a client computer system; wherein the clientcomputer system comprises: one or more processors; a network interfaceconfigured to couple to said server computer system via a data network;and logic encoded in one or more computer-readable media whereinexecution by the one or more processors of the client computer systemcauses: sending a plurality of permissions nonces to said servercomputer system and receiving a plurality of authentication permissionsfrom said server computer system; wherein at least one authenticationpermission of said plurality of authentication permissions is generatedby said server computer system using an Advanced Access Content System(AACS) cryptographic key and one of said plurality of permissionsnonces; and verifying that said at least one authentication permissionwas generated using said AACS cryptographic key and said one of saidplurality of permissions nonces; wherein the server computer systemcomprises: one or more processors; a network interface configured tocouple to said client computer system via said data network; and logicencoded in one or more computer-readable media wherein execution by theone or more processors of the server computer system causes: receivingsaid plurality of permission nonces from said client computer system;generating said plurality of authentication permissions and sending saidplurality of authentication permissions to said client computer system;authenticating said client computer system based at least in part onwhether said client computer system indicates to said server computersystem that said at least one of said authentication permissions wasgenerated using said AACS cryptographic key and said one of saidplurality of permissions nonces.